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In 1872, United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley offered
the following rationale for why Illinois could properly refuse Myra Bradwell
a license to practice law:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life ....
* * * The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the
general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon excep-
tional cases.'
Myra Bradwell, like countless women before and after her, had to chal-
lenge not only the laws of the state,2 but also the laws of history and society,
laws that seemed natural and universal-in Justice Bradley's words, the "law
of the Creator."3 In tracing the place of women in the legal profession, we
* This essay is an expanded version of two lectures delivered at the Shepard Broad
Law Center of Nova Southeastern University as part of the Leo Goodwin Distinguished Lec-
ture Series.
+ Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
1. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
2. Within five years after state courts denied law licenses to women, including Brad-
well, state and federal legislatures began authorizing admission. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE
AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 23 (1989) [hereinafter RHODE, JUSTICE AND
GENDER]. "[F]ive women lawyers ... were practicing in the United States" in 1870, but they
numbered just over a thousand by the turn of the century as twenty states admitted women to
their bars. Id.
3. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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are, therefore, talking about more than strictly legal change. Changes in our
laws and public policies are part of the larger struggle to change the way we
think and how we relate to one another in our everyday lives. Moreover,
while women in the legal profession have not always agreed on the role law
can and should play in this larger struggle, they have historically agreed that
law is an important element in the struggle for social equality.
In light of Justice Bradley's remarks, we should not be surprised that
women have recognized law as a powerful force, shaping the reality of their
everyday lives. Myra Bradwell was denied a license to practice law because,
in Justice Bradley's words, she "had no legal existence separate from her
husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social
state."4 Without a legally recognized separate identity, she could not form
contracts on her own. The law reflected the belief that a woman belonged in
the private sphere of home and family; she simply had no place in public life.
Indeed, this rigid notion of private and public spheres, of separate spheres for
women and men, is at the heart of women's experiences of subordination.
And the story of women and law over the last century is largely the story of
women's many challenges to entrenched notions of what is public and what
is private and how the law should understand this distinction or, perhaps
more accurately, what role the law should play in breaking down this distinc-
tion.'
The brief historical overview in the first part of this essay highlights
women's impact on the law and legal profession. In particular, it traces how,
once women gained access to and recognition under the law, they began con-
testing the law from the inside by transforming its underlying assumptions
and using it as a tool for broader social change. Because of their efforts,
gender stereotypes and assumptions that once seemed "natural" and universal
are no longer acceptable bases for our laws. We now aspire to construct laws
and institutions more representative of the diverse society in which we live.
Moreover, as I argue in the second part of the essay, as lawyers and judges,
we should draw upon our diversity and resist the temptation to replace old
generalizations with new ones. That is, rather than asking how a distinctly
"female" presence, or voice, has changed the legal profession and the judici-
ary, we should ask how the legal profession can better recognize and incor-
porate the range of styles women have to offer. By embracing our differ-
ences, rather than seeking a unified voice, we honor the contributions of gen-
erations of women activists and scholars.
4. Id.
5. See infra Section I.
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I. WOMEN'S IMPACT ON THE LAW: BREAKING DOWN STEREOTYPES,
CREATING POSSIBILITIES
Before women could use the law as a force for change, they had to fight
it on its own terms. In other words, they sought to be recognized under the
law in the same way men were. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was
first proposed by the National Women's Party in 1921.6 To the extent the
law reinforced the idea that women had no place in public life, the ERA was
designed to change this by guaranteeing their equal access-for example,
their rights to control property, to contract, to sue, and to serve on juries.7 In
the 1960s, building on the civil rights movement, women continued this fight
for formal equality, a fight that resulted in landmark legislation: the Equal
Pay Act of 19638 and Title VII,9 which prohibit discrimination by employers
on the basis of sex. In addition, once the laws were enacted, women made
sure they were implemented. For example, when the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) failed to enforce Title VII, women formed
the National Organization of Women to monitor the agency and advocate for
serious enforcement of claims. '0
Because of women's efforts, the law finally began to recognize women
as equal members of public society. Of course, formal changes in the law
did not translate into immediate social change. Statistics from then and now
illustrate how slowly change occurs. Fewer than 5% of lawyers were women
in the 1960s 1" and fewer than 2% of all law professors were women. 2 De-
spite the fact that law schools began abandoning their male-only admissions
policies in the 1970s, only 13% of lawyers were women in 1984."3 Today,
6. Jo Freeman, Social Revolution and the ERA, 3 SOC. F. 145, 145 (1988) [hereinafter
Freeman, Social Revolution]; see also RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 35 (not-
ing that advocates of the amendment introduced a version of it in every congressional session
from 1923 to 1972).
7. Freeman, Social Revolution, supra note 6, at 145.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (2000).
10. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 198 (1989-90); see also Jo Freeman, From Suffrage to Women's Libera-
tion: Feminism in Twentieth-Century America, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 513 (Jo
Freeman ed., 5th ed. 1995).
11. Different Voices, Different Choices? The Impact of More Women Lawyers and
Judges on the Justice System, 74 JUDICATURE 138, 140 tbl.2 (1990) [hereinafter Different
Voices].
12. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 219 tbl. 12.1 (2d ed. 1993).
13. Id. at 220-21; Different Voices, supra note 11, at 138.
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women make up only about 30% of the profession. 4 Although the percent-
age of female judges in the federal judiciary doubled in the 1990s, today,
women make up only about 24% of the federal bench.' 5 And by recent esti-
mates, only about 29% of the judges on state courts of last resort are
women. 6 In addition, although women now make up more than half of en-
tering law school classes, only about 20% of full law professors are
women,17 and a little over 17% of law firm partners are women. The num-
bers are even less encouraging for women of color, who constitute only 5%
of the total number of full law professors.' 9 As recently as 2005, "81% of
[minority female associates had left] their law firms within five years of be-
ing hired."" °
Yet, even in small numbers, women lawyers and law professors have
had an enormous impact on formal laws and their enforcement. Beginning in
1971, with Ruth Bader Ginsburg's United States Supreme Court victory in
Reed v. Reed,2' women lawyers successfully challenged discriminatory laws
and practices on equal protection grounds. It is quite fitting that, twenty-five
years later, Justice Ginsburg would author the opinion in United States v.
Virginia,22 emphasizing that-in her words--'"generalizations about 'the way
women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer jus-
tify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them
14. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED
AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 13 (2001) [hereinafter RHODE, UNFINISHED
AGENDA].
15. See ABA Comn'n on Women in the Profession, A Current Glance at Women in the
Law 2006 4, http://www.abanet.org/women/CurrentGlanceStatistics2006.pdf [hereinafter
Current Glance at Women in the Law]; see also Kate Zernike, Pool of Female Judges Has
Boomed in 24 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at AlO (recognizing that 24% is a notable
increase from 6% in 1981 when Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was nominated by President
Ronald Reagan).
16. Current Glance at Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 4; see also Lynn Hecht Scha-
fran, Not from Central Casting: The Amazing Rise of Women in the American Judiciary, 36 U.
TOL. L. REv. 953, 954-56 (2004) (discussing the number of women in the federal and state
judiciaries).
17. RHODE, UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 14, at 13, 27.
18. Current Glance at Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 2.
19. RHODE, UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 14, at 27.
20. Paulette Brown & Cathy Fleming, 'Invisible' Attorneys Seek Notice, THE NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 23, 2006, available at http://www.eapdlaw.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?news=742 (click
on "PDF & Printable Article" hyperlink); see also ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS 9 (2006),
http://www.abanet.org/women/Visiblelnvisibility-ExecSummary.pdf (providing an in-depth
study of the experiences of women of color in private law firms).
21. 404 U.S. 71(1971).
22. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
[Vol. 31
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outside the average description. 23 Indeed, estimates of what was considered
appropriate for most women are what prompted Justice Bradley to conclude
that women's exclusion from public life followed from the natural law of the
creator.
But women in the early 1970s challenged this assumption. Building on
the approach used in race discrimination cases, they argued that laws should
not distinguish between men and women who are similarly situated.24 At
that time, plenty of state laws included sex-specific distinctions, which the
Supreme Court had routinely upheld. For example, in 1961, in Hoyt v. Flor-
ida,25 the Court upheld a state statute excluding women from juror rolls,
unless they specifically asked to be included.26 But in 1971, the Court
changed its approach in Reed.27 Persuaded by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
other attorneys working for the ACLU's Women's Rights Project, the Court
struck down an Idaho statute that gave preference to men over women as
administrators of estates.28 Idaho justified the distinction as a reasonable
means of resolving a tie between two individuals equally qualified by their
relationship to the decedent. 29 The state argued that men should be preferred
because they generally have more business experience than women.3' The
Court rejected this argument, describing the male preference as "the very
kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause"
of the Constitution.3'
Other United States Supreme Court victories followed the Reed deci-
sion. But although the Court struck down many sex-specific distinctions on
equal protection grounds, it did not adopt the approach advanced by
women's rights activists and litigators. Women had argued that the courts
should apply a standard of strict scrutiny, the same level of scrutiny already
applied to classifications based on race and the toughest test under the Con-
stitution's Equal Protection Clause. 32 But in light of the far-reaching impli-
23. Id. at 550 (emphasis in original).
24. See generally Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common Fate of Discrimination": Race-
Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001) (discussing
the historical emergence and development of the analogy to race in feminist thought and activ-
ism).
25. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
26. Id. at 69.
27. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
28. Id. at 77.
29. Brief for Respondent at 12, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).
30. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
31. Id. at76.
32. See generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 86-92 (discussing the
United States Supreme Court's "search for standards" in cases involving sex-based classifica-
tions).
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cations of this kind of test-for example, how could women's exclusion
from the draft survive?-the Court stopped short of strict scrutiny.33 When
women's rights activists realized the Court would not adopt this stringent
test, they made a strategic choice to focus on contesting sex-based classifica-
tions that disadvantaged men. 34  They hoped this strategy would steadily
weaken the stereotypes and generalizations that made women second-class
citizens.35
The strategy resulted in some success. For example, in Craig v.
Boren,36 the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the "sale of
3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to [women] under the age of
18 .,,3 The Court also invalidated social security laws that treated widows
more favorably than widowers.38 It held that alimony after divorce should be
awarded on a gender-neutral basis.39 And it struck down a state statute ex-
cluding men from a state-supported nursing school.4 °
Largely because of these early efforts, law was transformed into a stra-
tegic tool for undermining long-held stereotypes and assumptions regarding
sex. Law is, however, an imperfect tool. As a product of history and social
context, it is undoubtedly lopsided. Guarantees of formal equality could not
erase the law's foundations in male-centered assumptions and standards,
such as the division of the public from the private.41 For years, laws had
33. Id.
34. MARGARET A. BERGER, LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF WOMEN: A REVIEW FOR THE FORD
FOUNDATION 18-19 (1980).
35. Id. at 19.
36. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing intermediate scrutiny standard for sex classi-
fications).
37. Id. at 191-92.
38. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201-02, 217 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 637-39, 653 (1975).
39. Off v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270-71, 283 (1979).
40. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 719, 723 (1982). The Court did,
however, uphold some distinctions compensating women for historical disadvantage. See
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1977) (upholding social security provisions al-
lowing women to exclude three more low-earning years than men when calculating base-
period income); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508-10 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351, 352, 355-56 (1974) (upholding state statute giving widows a $500 annual exemp-
tion in property taxes).
41. See Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 847-48 (2000) (noting that "attacking the public/private line has
been one of the primary concerns (if not the primary concern) of feminist legal theorizing for
over two decades" and arguing that the distinction has continued value for feminist theory).
These critiques of the public-private dichotomy are part of a larger body of literature discuss-
ing how seemingly neutral and universal legal concepts subordinate women. See, e.g., Fran-
[Vol. 31
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governed the public sphere and treated the private sphere of home and family
as inviolate.
Formal equality, the idea that women should be treated the same as
men, therefore, created the illusion of choice for many women. It granted
women access to the legal profession without ensuring a workplace free of
sexual harassment. It mandated that the state affirmatively treat women the
same as men, guaranteeing them equal protection of the laws, without ex-
tending the reach of the law into the private sphere where women frequently
endured sexual and physical violence. It prohibited discrimination in em-
ployment, but did not recognize different treatment of pregnant women as
sex-based discrimination. After a long, hard fight for access to the public
sphere, women realized that the rigid separation of public and private had
itself to be challenged-a critique that resonates in the 1970s slogan "the
personal is political. 42
As feminist scholars and activists in the 1970s and 1980s turned their
attention to the reality of women's private lives, they focused especially on
the ways in which women's lives differed from men's. Some feminists cele-
brated this difference, often credited to women's experiences as mothers and
caretakers, and argued that society should recognize women's "different
voice" as equal rather than inferior to the male voice.43 Others argued that
women's difference was a result of the underlying structural imbalance in
power between men and women in society." Differences in this view are a
result of men's dominance, not women's inherent nature, a perspective re-
flected in Catharine MacKinnon's frequently quoted statement: "Women
value care because men have valued us according to the care we give
them."45
ces E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1497 (1983).
42. For further discussion of the public-private distinction, see Carole Pateman, Feminist
Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281 (S.I.
Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983); Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1289, 1289-1608 (1982).
43. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 613-616 (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Dif-
ferent Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39,
63 (1985); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 173-74 (1982).
44. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 39 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; Ann Scales, The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1376-80 (1986); Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1003, 1007 (1986).
45. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 44, at 39.
2007]
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Professor MacKinnon's "inequality approach" to sex discrimination
was particularly influential.4 6  It called into question the idea that laws
should treat men and women the same, that is, as if they are similarly situ-
ated. In her landmark book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, Profes-
sor MacKinnon argues that the "only question for litigation is whether the
policy or practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance of an
underclass or a deprived position because of gender status."47 This approach
to sex discrimination and its application to employment practices helped lead
to the Supreme Court's recognition of sexual harassment as a violation of
Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.48 Following the consen-
sus of the appellate courts and the EEOC, the Supreme Court held that sexual
harassment creating a hostile work environment violates Title VII, even
when the victim does not suffer an economic injury. 9
About the time Meritor was decided in the 1980s, women were also en-
gaged in legal battles to decide how the law should handle the fact that only
women give birth to children. 0  In 1974, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 5 1 the Su-
preme Court upheld, under the Equal Protection Clause, a California statute
excluding pregnancy from its list of covered disabilities. 52 According to the
Court, the statute did not exclude any individual on the basis of sex; rather, it
simply did not cover a particular disability (i.e., pregnancy) that affects some
but not all women. 3 A couple years after Geduldig, the Court followed the
same reasoning in deciding a case under Title VII. 54  Congress disagreed,
46. In addition to Professor MacKinnon, many other feminist theorists and scholars in-
fluenced legal practice and helped inspire political change. See generally Cynthia Grant
Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and the
Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249 (1998) (discussing the interrelated nature of femi-
nist theory and practice).
47. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 117-18 (1979).
48. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
49. Id. at 67-68. In addition to changing employment laws, feminists advocated the
reform of criminal laws (for example, rape and domestic violence laws) that failed to redress
women's injuries. See generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 237-52.
These legal changes chipped away at the standards and assumptions that placed sexuality and
sexual conduct outside the reach of the law as something private and personal and therefore
not actionable. See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557,
558 (2006) (discussing feminist critique of the public-private dichotomy and its significance
to the domestic violence movement).
50. See generally Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treat-
ment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985).
51. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
52. See id. at 495-97.
53. Id.
54. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
[Vol. 31
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however, and overturned this decision by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act (PDA), an amendment to Title VII that makes discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy unlawful sex discrimination."5 Although feminists in
the 1 980s agreed that pregnant women deserve protection under the law, they
disagreed about how the law should approach the issue.56 While some femi-
nists argued that pregnancy should be treated like any other disability (an
equal treatment approach), others pushed for laws that would give pregnant
women special benefits (a special treatment approach).57
In one important Supreme Court case,58 feminists actually argued both
in favor of and against a California statute requiring that employers provide
leave to employees disabled by pregnancy, but not to employees disabled for
other reasons.5 9 The statute was challenged as contrary to the PDA, which
requires that pregnancy be treated like other temporary disabilities in the
employment context.60  Some feminists argued that the statute was pre-
empted by the PDA;61 others argued that the statute should be upheld as long
as employers are required to provide the same leave to other temporarily
disabled employees; 6 and a third group argued that the statute should stand
because it enables women to exercise their procreative rights on equal terms
with men.63 In the end, the Court held that the PDA was intended to prohibit
discrimination against pregnancy, not prevent states from enacting laws that
benefit pregnant workers. 4 It did not, therefore, preempt the California stat-
ute, and employers did not have to extend the same benefits to other disabled
employees.65
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
56. See RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 38-46.
57. Id. This debate over sameness versus difference did not begin in the 1980s. It has a
long history. For example, throughout the first part of the twentieth century, feminists fought
both for and against labor legislation that treated women differently from men (e.g., by re-
stricting the number of hours they could work). Id.
58. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (feminist scholars and
groups filed three different amicus briefs).
59. Id. at 290-92.
60. Id. at 292-94 (Stevens, J., concurring).
61. See Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 48-49, Ca. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494), 1986 WL 728369.
62. Brief for the Nat'l Org. for Women et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
11, Ca. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, Inc. 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494), 1986 WL
728368.
63. Brief for the Coal. for Reprod. Equal. in the Workplace et al. as Amici Curiae for
Respondent at 35-36, Ca. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, Inc., 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No.
85-494), 1986 WL 728372.
64. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 287.
65. Id. at 292.
2007]
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Not surprisingly, the Court's decision did not settle the larger issue.
Feminists continued to debate how the law should treat men and women in
contexts where they are inescapably different.66 Although this debate is fre-
quently described as a disagreement that weakened the women's movement,
we could also understand it as a logical step in the struggle to further social
equality. After all, how could women be heard as lawyers, activists, and law
professors without the openings provided by formal equality? Once women
gained access to legal institutions, they could more easily critique them. We
should not be surprised that they offered different critiques.
Of course, the debate regarding women's difference was not really new.
As soon as women began fighting for legal change, they began disagreeing
over how the law could improve the quality of women's lives. Even as the
National Women's Party advocated the Equal Rights Amendment, other
women's organizations vigorously opposed it, fearing it would mean the end
of protective labor laws that set maximum hours and wages and governed
working conditions for women.6 7 While ERA advocates argued such laws
were paternalistic mechanisms used to deny women desirable jobs and the
pay they deserved, proponents of protective legislation argued that laws
should recognize the reality of women's everyday lives-as mothers and
caretakers of home and family.68 In their view, treating women and men as
"similarly situated" was a fiction that ignored the ways in which women's
lives were undeniably different.69 In particular, they argued that motherhood
deserved special protection.7°
The Supreme Court embraced a similar view of motherhood for many
years.71 According to the Court, women's childbearing responsibilities not
only placed them at a disadvantage, but also made them the proper wards of
the public interest and, therefore, the state.72 In 1908, the Court reasoned:
"[T]he physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race., 73 Even as
the civil rights movement was underway in the 1960s, the Court was still
66. See generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2.
67. See Freeman, Social Revolution, supra note 6, at 145. Women's groups opposed the
addition of "sex" to Title VII for the same reasons. See JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND
INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 233-34 (1991).
68. See RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 35-37.
69. See id. at 37.
70. Id.
71. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
72. Id.
73. Id. (upholding as constitutional protective labor laws limiting the working hours of
women).
[Vol. 31
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss2/5
CHALLENGING WHAT IS NA TURAL AND PROPER
referring to the "special responsibilities" women have "as the center of home
and family life."74
While proponents of formal equality eventually won the battle over pro-
tective legislation, the critique of liberal equality continued.75 The idea that
the law should enable individuals to pursue their own, self-interested choices
on equal terms assumes that individuals enjoy the same freedom to choose.
But our choices are undoubtedly constrained by a range of factors, over
which we have little control-for example, our gender, our race, and our
socioeconomic circumstances.76 Formal equality has helped some women,
while failing to address the needs of others.77
Indeed, as contemporary feminist theorists have emphasized, accounts
of women's experiences are all too frequently based on the experiences of
white middle-class women.78 These accounts can ignore the ways in which
some women are subjected to multiple forms of discrimination, as well as the
ways in which some women participate in the subordination of other women.
For example, formal equality may give a relatively privileged white woman
access to professional employment opportunities, while doing very little for
the woman she hires to care for her home and children. 79 Hence, the crucial
question is: How do women use their collective strength to continue fighting
for an egalitarian society, while at the same time recognizing the diversity of
women's experiences?
I think diversity can actually be our collective strength. Once we leave
behind the rigid view of a world divided between essential categories of
"woman" and "man" and recognize the messy reality in all its diversity, we
74. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (upholding a state statute permitting, but not
requiring, women to serve on juries).
75. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis,
63 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1984). Not all feminists, however, rejected the liberal rights discourse.
Some theorists articulated feminist approaches to the liberal discourse of individual rights.
See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Equality Across Difference: A Place for Rights Discourse, 3
WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1987); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals
from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987). For an overview of three
generations of feminist thought, see Adelaide H. Villmoare, Feminist Jurisprudence and Po-
litical Vision, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 443 (1999).
76. See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L.
REv. 431, 438 (1990).
77. See Catherine Albiston, Anti-Essentialism and the Work/Family Dilemma, 20
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 30, 36 (2005) (arguing that the "master narratives" surround-
ing work and family (e.g., family leave policies) leave out the interests of less privileged
women).
78. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
79. Albiston, supra note 77, at 36-37.
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may be in a better position to attack the underlying structures that further
inequality-that is, to question Law, with a capital L, or what Justice Bradley
called the "law of the Creator."8 In truth, this has always been the real tar-
get. The debate regarding difference reflected in the disagreement over
equal versus special treatment is really a debate about short-term solutions.
Fortunately, most of us agree on the long-term goal, and thankfully, we do
seem closer to that goal today than we were when I began my legal career.
Rather than using the law to protect women so that they are able to
carry out their domestic duties, our Supreme Court now speaks in terms of
the law as a remedial and forward-looking device.8 Recently, in discussing
the virtues of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),82 which gives
both men and women the right to family and medical leave in some cases,
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained how gender stereotypes contribute to so-
cial inequality.83 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by paral-
lel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for
men. Because employers continued to regard the family as the
woman's domain, they often denied men similar accommodations
or discouraged them from taking leave. These mutually reinforc-
ing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that
forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family
caregiver, and fostered employers' stereotypical views about
women's commitment to work and their value as employees.
84
These words leave little doubt that women have made significant pro-
gress. There is nothing natural about a woman's historically inferior posi-
tion, and consequently, the law should break down rather than build up
stereotypes. It is a tool in the larger struggle to give individuals more
choices in how they order their lives. As Deborah Rhode explains, we
should empower individuals and improve the quality of life for both women
and men: "Our priority should be to empower women as well as men to re-
80. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
81. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that state
employees may sue the states for failure to comply with the FMLA).
82. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-2619, 2631-
2636, 2651-2654 (2000).
83. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 538 U.S. at 736.
84. Id.
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shape the institutions that are shaping them. At issue is not simply equality
between the sexes, but the quality of life for both of them.,
85
II. WOMEN'S IMPACT ON THE JUDICIARY: SHARED STORIES, DIFFERENT
VOICES
After a century of tireless advocacy and remarkable change, generaliza-
tions about women are no longer accepted as legitimate foundations for our
laws or legal theories. But although we have rejected gender stereotypes as
an appropriate basis for our laws and institutions, empirical studies have con-
tinued to focus on the possibility of difference by asking whether women
think differently or speak in a "different voice."86 Scientists continue to ask
whether women and men are hardwired differently.87 And studies in the
social sciences frequently look for evidence of this theoretical difference-
85. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 320. Nowhere is this desire for a
better quality of life more apparent than in the daily struggle to balance work and family.
Largely because of the efforts of women in the legal profession, the FMLA is a reality. It
requires employers with more than fifty employees to give both men and women equal
amounts (twelve weeks) of unpaid leave for specified family and medical reasons. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 2611-2612 (2000). Moreover, there is growing evidence that women are right
about the need for this gender-neutral law governing the work-family balance. E.g.,
CATALYST, WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY ISN'T JUST A WOMAN'S ISSUE 1 (Aug. 2003),
http://www.catalystwomen.org/files/view/Workplace%20Flexibility%20Isn't%2Just%20a%2
OWomen's%20Issue.pdf. Recent studies report that men and women alike desire more flexi-
ble work options. Id. For instance, 92% of United States workers report that they do not have
enough flexibility to take care of personal responsibilities, such as caring for sick children or
parents. GEO. UNIV. LAW CTR., MEETING THE NEEDS OF TODAY'S FAMILIES: THE ROLE OF
WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 6, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/workplaceflexibil-
ity2010/documents/FF BW FI Fact.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). Unfortunately, many
workers are still not covered by laws, such as the FMLA, or by employment policies guaran-
teeing leave. Id. For example, only 30% of workers are covered by policies allowing them to
take time off to care for sick children. Id.
Men and women also express the same desire to work fewer hours. See CATALYST,
supra at 1. Dissatisfaction with work-life balance is particularly prevalent in the legal profes-
sion. Id. A 2003 study reported that two-thirds of law graduates, both men and women, said
they have difficulty balancing their personal and professional lives. Id This is particularly
true of young lawyers in large firms. See BRIAN MELENDEZ, ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION
SURVEY: CAREER SATISFACTION, http://www.abanet.org/yld/satisfaction_800.doc (last visited
May 25, 2007). A 2000 ABA study found that nearly 81% of the young lawyers in these
firms might consider leaving their firms. Id. Although the legal profession has helped create
the conditions for change, as an institution, the profession itself is very resistant to change.
One of the most pressing questions for the profession today is whether it will lead or follow in
meeting demands for a work environment that recognizes both women and men as individuals
with personal and family responsibilities.
86. See generally supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN 1-9 (2006).
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for example, do women in the judiciary decide cases differently from men?8"
The best answer to this question is that we do not know because the studies,
as a whole, are inconclusive.89 More important, however, are the implica-
tions of these studies. In my view, we should be asking why we continue to
pose this question.
I am not suggesting that we stop paying attention to how many women
are serving as members of state and federal judiciaries. If we are to be a rep-
resentative democracy, our governmental institutions must reflect the diverse
membership of our society, and we should work especially toward ensuring
access for members of historically excluded groups, such as women and ra-
cial minorities. We should also encourage the changes diversity inevitably
brings. Women in the judiciary have certainly had a positive effect on soci-
ety in general and the legal profession specifically.90 For example, their
presence has encouraged young women to pursue legal careers, and they
have raised awareness of gender bias in the court system. 91 Indeed, in my
experience, the presence of women in judicial roles has raised awareness
within the judiciary concerning the subtle, but powerful, implications of lan-
88. See, e.g., Sarah Westergren, Note, Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals Revisited:
The Data Since 1994, 92 GEO. L.J. 689 (2004); Linda S. Maule, A Different Voice: The Femi-
nine Jurisprudence of the Minnesota State Supreme Court, 9 BUFF. WOMEN's L.J. 295 (2001);
Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race, and Partisanship on the Michigan Supreme Court,
63 ALB. L. REv. 1205 (2000); see also Theresa M. Beiner, Female Judging, 36 U. TOL. L.
REv. 821, 821 nn.2-9 (2005) (citing studies by social scientists).
89. See Heather Elliott, The Difference Women Judges Make: Stare Decisis, Norms of
Collegiality, and "Feminine Jurisprudence" A Research Proposal, 16 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 41,
43-44 (2001). There is, however, some support for difference in sex discrimination cases.
Beiner, supra note 88, at 824 (citing John Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The
Influence of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 67
JUDICATURE 165, 171-72 (1983); and Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race
on Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 1981-1996 (1999) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author)).
90. See generally Mary L. Clark, One Man's Token Is Another Woman's Breakthrough?
The Appointment of the First Women Federal Judges, 49 VILL. L. REv. 487 (2004) (providing
history of the first women federal judges and discussing the social significance of women
judges).
91. See Hope Viner Samborn, Gender Bias in the Courts: Working Toward Change,
PERSP., Winter/Spring 2002, at 4, 6, available at http://www.abanet.org/women/perspectives/
PSPGenderBias2.pdf. The National Association of Women Judges has supported programs to
educate judges about gender bias in decision-making and courtroom interaction and suggest
ways to further gender fairness. Id. In addition, the International Association of Women
Judges sponsored a program that provided training to more than 600 judges and other profes-
sionals on the application of international and regional human rights conventions in cases
involving discrimination or violence against women. See International Association of Women
Judges, http://www.iawj.org/what/jep.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) (describing the "Jurispru-
dence of Equality Program").
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guage and the use of particular words in judicial writing. More than once, as
a member of an appellate panel, I have requested very minor changes in
opinion language to avoid disparaging sex-based connotations. Thus, the
involvement of women in the judicial process certainly has some effect, al-
though it is often invisible to litigants and the public.
In addition, women clearly have different experiences to draw upon
from their male colleagues. As Justice O'Connor often notes, after graduat-
ing at the top of her law school class, she was offered a job as a legal secre-
tary,92 an experience her male peers did not share. I, like all women lawyers
of my generation, have similar stories, such as the time a partner at a law
school interview said to me: "Deanell, you have a very good record, but
don't you know that you have to be better than the men to get hired?" After
law school, I ran into similar barriers. For example, when I returned to Kan-
sas after working in securities law in Washington, I discovered that a re-
spected Kansas corporation was seeking an attorney to assist the general
counsel as the company embarked upon some securities transactions. The
company's offices were in a small town within driving distance of where I
planned to live. I doubted then, and doubt today, that anyone else with my
level of experience was interested in that position. After two very positive
interview days, I never heard another word from the company, not even a
rejection letter. Many years later, I heard-through a rumor mill-that I was
not hired because of concerns about a woman accompanying company offi-
cials to New York to prepare for the public offering. I have no idea whether
this is true, but it was, at the very least, a plausible explanation in the minds
of some individuals. Unfortunately, many women in the legal profession
have similar stories to tell.
In light of these stories, it is no surprise that 81% of the women judges
surveyed in a 1990 study said sex discrimination was a problem, but none of
the male judges identified it as a problem. 9' Women have experienced their
gender in ways men have not, and these experiences no doubt influence how
they see the world. But does this mean women think or reason in a distinctly
feminine way? The fact that the empirical studies are inconclusive does not
mean we have yet to find the answer. The answer may simply be that we
cannot generalize about sex differences. And, I would add, we should not.
This is dangerous business.
To see how it is dangerous, just consider the implications of a conclu-
sive answer. What if a study concludes that women on average do in fact
92. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1549
(1991).
93. Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive La Difference? 73 JUDICATURE
204, 207 (1990).
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decide cases differently from men? This begs the question of why women
decide cases differently. The typical answer-one grounded in both feminist
theories of cultural difference and anti-feminist theories of difference-is
that women reason from an ethic of care and connectedness, rather than an
abstract and hierarchical logic of rules.94 That is, women value obligation
and responsibility over rights and rules, and they care more about preserving
relationships than playing by the rules.95
Responding to these theories of difference, many women have cau-
tioned that a view of women as caring and men as rational sounds very much
like the myth of "true womanhood" used to perpetuate women's inferior
status. 96 Generalizations about the way women are and think have been used
throughout history to exclude women from the law and other professions.
And this continues to be a danger today. We all remember the controversy
surrounding the remarks of Harvard's president almost two years ago. 97 He
suggested that the lack of women in the hard sciences may be a result of in-
trinsic differences between women and men. 98 Many people expressed con-
cern that the notion of intrinsic differences could be used to explain and ex-
cuse women's absence from the sciences. 99 In other words, generalizations
about difference threaten to close more doors than they open. Moreover,
they simply do not hold true in reality. We can always find exceptions.
In fact, studies that find some support for a difference in male and fe-
male judging also show how frequently men and women agree. For exam-
94. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 43, at 47-48; Sherry, supra note 43, at 543;
see also Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988) (exploring the ways in which feminist theory may
inform the tradition ofjudging).
95. For a discussion and critique of the idea of "gender-based styles of lawyering," see
Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992). Cahn argues for a con-
textual approach leading to a feminist, rather than feminine, lawyering process. Id. at 1039-
42. Instead of labeling style by gender, she encourages feminist theory to examine different
styles to gain insights that can be used to challenge dominant practices and create new ap-
proaches to lawyering. See id.
96. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 92, at 1553. Over two centuries ago, Mary Woll-
stonecraft eloquently warned against this view of women's nature: "It would be an endless
task to trace the variety of meanness, cares, and sorrows into which women are plunged by the
prevailing opinion that they were created rather to feel than reason, and that all the power they
obtain must be obtained by their charms and weakness." MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A
VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN WITH STRICTURES ON POLITICAL AND MORAL
SUBJECTS 50 (1792), available at http://olldownload.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Wollstone-
craft 0730.pdf.
97. See Sam Dillon & Sara Rimer, No Break in the Storm over Harvard President's
Words, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at A14.
98. See id.
99. Id.
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ple, a 1993 study of appellate judges found that "[m]ore than 63% of the
votes cast by women supported" plaintiffs' discrimination claims, while 46%
of the men's votes favored plaintiffs.'00 This is a statistically significant dif-
ference, showing some support for the theory that women decide discrimina-
tion cases differently from men.' But this can be misleading. What about
the nearly 37% of the female votes cast against discrimination claims and the
46% of the male votes cast in favor of such claims?10 2 Significant numbers
of men and women cast votes not predicted by the theory, leaving us to won-
der why the statistically significant difference matters. We have rejected
stereotypes and generalizations as proper foundations for the law. So, what
would we do if we did find some empirical support for these stereotypes?
Real or not, generalizations always exclude some people. We know this
because, for every generalization, we can think of a story-our own or
someone else's-that undermines it. Interestingly, although feminist legal
theory contains many different viewpoints and approaches, scholars and ac-
tivists have shared a belief in the power of narrative for some time.' 3 From
the consciousness-raising efforts of the 1970s to contemporary postmodern
critiques, feminists have recognized the power of storytelling."°  Stories
validate individual experience. They help us understand the concrete reality
of individuals' lives. Moreover, they help us make connections. These con-
nections are formed when we hear elements of own experience in the stories
of others. But they are also formed when we hear stories that are radically
different from our own experience. They help us realize the diversity of hu-
man experience and encourage us to see the world from a different perspec-
tive. 0
100. Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77
JUDICATURE 129, 131 (1993).
101. See id
102. See id
103. See Mario L. Barnes, Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the
Power of Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 941, 948-49 (2006); Linda E. Fisher, I Know It
When I See It, or What Makes Scholarship Feminist: A Cautionary Tale, 12 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 439, 439-40 (2003); Jean C. Love, Commentary: The Value of Narrative in
Legal Scholarship and Teaching, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 87, 87 (1998); Kathryn Abrams,
Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 973 (1991); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 863-67 (1990); Patricia Williams, On Being the Ob-
ject of Property, 14 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CUL. SOC. 5 (1988).
104. See Bartlett, supra note 103, at 863-67; Abrams, supra note 103, at 973.
105. Instead of abstract generalizations, our difference is what we have in common: "The
human universal becomes difference itself. Difference is what we most fundamentally have in
common." Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4,
32 (1986) (describing feminist view).
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As a woman and a judge, I have quite a collection of stories that would
likely resonate with other women, as well as stories that demonstrate how we
sometimes experience things differently. I have often referred to these sto-
ries as "W" stories, stories that are unique to my experience as a woman.1 °6
For example, I often tell the story of the first day that the Tenth Circuit had
an all-female panel for oral argument. '07 The reports in the press were comi-
cal for their non-newsworthiness. The press reported comments, such as
"they were very well prepared," and "they asked good questions." On a
lighter note, I will never forget the quizzical look on the face of one of my
very bright male law clerks one Halloween morning when my children were
young, as he said with some puzzlement: "I think I may work for the only
federal judge in the nation who stayed up all night to make a costume for a
child!" His reaction was likely grounded in gendered stereotypes and as-
sumptions, but I always chuckle about the incident. (By the way, sewing a
very furry costume made my day job look easy!) Even a lighthearted anec-
dote, such as this, illustrates how stereotypes pervade our everyday interac-
tions. But generalizing about women or men, in the judiciary or anywhere
else, is often misleading and almost always fails to capture the varied nu-
ances and dimensions of human experience and interests.
When I tell these stories, I hope they speak to the experiences of some
women, but I also hope they inspire some listeners to try to see the world
from a standpoint unlike their own. We learn a great deal from other peo-
ple's stories. This is, in fact, what law students come to understand as they
learn the law by reading cases based on people's experiences,' 08 and they
think about how the law should resolve hypothetical controversies. Simi-
larly, judging is an exercise in listening to stories. Judges attempt to see the
world from many different perspectives.109 Indeed, we expect each judge to
try to transcend his or her own views and experiences in order to understand
the perspectives of others.
In short, we are better served by stories than by generalizations. The
more we expand our limited perspectives, the better lawyers, teachers, and
judges we will be. We should learn from the feminist tradition of connecting
106. Deanell Reece Tacha, "W" Stories: Women in Leadership Positions in the Judiciary,
97 W. VA. L. REv. 683 (1995).
107. See, e.g., id. at 700.
108. See Love, supra note 103, at 88.
109. Katharine Bartlett argues that feminist theory should encourage "the effort to extend
one's limited perspective .... I cannot transcend my perspective; by definition, whatever
perspective I currently have limits my view. But I can improve my perspective by stretching
my imagination to identify and understand the perspectives of others." Bartlett, supra note
103, at 881-82.
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to each other through our real-life stories, without adopting one story as rep-
resentative of us all. This is, after all, how our laws have come to disavow
many stereotypes and generalizations-through individual stories (i.e., cases)
that challenge our views of what is natural and universal. In the end, it
seems we gain little, and risk a great deal, by continuing to ask whether cer-
tain stereotypes hold true in practice. Instead, we should follow the example
of Myra Bradwell and countless other women, who have worked to create a
society of possibilities, rather than categorical limitations.
III. CONCLUSION
So, after decades of legal change, what can we say about the impact of
women on the law? When asked about women's impact on politics, Florence
Ellinwood Allen, the first woman appointed to an Article III court, replied:
You can hardly judge women's effect on politics merely from the
action of individual women officeholders. We don't judge men's
effect on politics in such a manner. And it will take a long time
for women's effect on politics to register so that we may properly
appraise it. But the constant filtering into the home of information
about government, through mothers now as well as fathers, is mak-
ing itself felt. 110
Similarly, we may conclude that we can hardly judge women's impact on the
law, as lawyers, judges, and teachers, by looking at individual acts. But we
can have faith that women's presence in the profession is making itself felt.
Women have challenged what seemed natural and universal; indeed, they
have questioned what was once touted as Law, with a capital "L," the notion
that women are "unfit" for public life and that public laws ought not to med-
dle in the private space women are destined to inhabit. In doing so, women
have used the law to help create the conditions necessary for broader social
change.
It is this ardent commitment to a more inclusive vision of society that
has left its mark and inspired a new generation of women lawyers to continue
breaking down rigid categories and untenable assumptions. As a student of
society and culture, Margaret Mead eloquently captured the promise of a
society able to transcend these limiting social constructions: "If we are to
achieve a richer culture, rich in contrasting values, we must recognize the
whole gamut of human potentialities, and so weave a less arbitrary social
110. N.R. Howard, Miss Allen Talks of Women's Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1934, avail-
able at http://womenslegalhistory.stanford.edu/articles/howard.htm.
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fabric, one in which each diverse human gift will find a fitting place."'1'
Women in the legal profession have moved us closer to this goal by exposing
what once appeared natural and proper as arbitrary and indefensible and by
insisting we work toward a society in which diverse human gifts may indeed
flourish.
111. MARGARET MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES (1935).
[Vol. 31
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss2/5
